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UNDERDETERMINATION
AND MODELS IN BIOLOGY
Abstract: Since the early 20th century 
underdetermination has been one of 
the most contentious problems in the
philosophy of science. In this article
I relate the underdetermination prob-
lem to models in biology and defend 
two main lines of argument: First, the
use of models in this discipline lends
strong support to the underdetermin-
ation thesis. Second, models and 
theories in biology are not determined 
strictly by the logic of representation
of the studied phenomena, but also by 
other constraints such as research tra-
ditions, backgrounds of the scientists,
aims of the research and available
technology. Convincing evidence for 
the existence of underdetermination
in biology, where models abound,
comes both from the fact that for 
a  natural phenomenon we can cre-
ate a  number of candidate models
but also from the fact that we do not 
have a universal rule that would ad-
judicate among them. Th is all makes
a strong case for the general validity of 
the underdetermination thesis.
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Abstrakt: Nedourčenost je jedním
ze zásadních problémů fi losofi e vědy 
od  počátku 20. století. Ve  svém pří-
spěvku vztahuju tezi o nedourčenosti 
k  biologickým modelům a  obhajuju 
následující dva argumenty: Za prvé, 
použití modelů v  této disciplíně 
dodává silnou váhu tezi o  nedour-
čenosti. Za  druhé, modely a  teorie 
v  biologii nejsou determinovány 
striktně logikou reprezentace stu-
dovaného jevu, ale také dalšími 
faktory, jako jsou výzkumné tradice, 
background vědců, cíle výzkumu 
a  dostupné technologie. Přesvědčivý 
důkaz o  existenci nedourčenosti 
v biologii, která modelů v hojné míře 
využívá, pramení nejenom z  faktu, 
že pro každý přírodní jev můžeme 
vytvořit velký počet alternativních 
modelů, ale také z faktu, že nedispo-
nujeme univerzálním pravidlem pro 
výběr mezi nimi. To vše mluví ve pro-
spěch platnosti teze o nedourčenosti.
Klíčová slova: nedourčenost; 
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Petr Jedlička
Underdetermination is a contentious issue in the philosophy of science. Since 
the inception of the problem by Duhem1 and Quine,2 which was later some-
what inaccurately dubbed the Duhem-Quine thesis, the original question 
has been discussed in various contexts in the philosophy of science and has 
also arisen in other disciplines. While Duhem remained within the confi nes 
of (physical) theory, Quine with his concept of the “web of belief” canvassed 
an all-encompassing version of epistemological underdetermination. Later 
philosophers took opposing stances regarding the problem (for example 
Laudan3 and van Fraassen4) with each camp mounting evidence for and 
against the existence of the phenomena or its importance. Adherents, who 
point out that underdetermination is an intrinsic feature of scientifi c theo-
ries that cannot be eradicated, oft en harness underdetermination to support 
their own philosophical positions (Feyerabend, Kuhn). On the other hand, 
critics including Laudan dismiss most types of underdetermination on the 
grounds of its unimportance for science, and consider the whole problem of 
underdetermination “overplayed”, especially by its modern day advocates 
such as STS and SSK theorists.5 Most philosophers usually fall somewhere
between the extremes and hold the moderate view that underdetermination 
does exist in one form or another.
Th e central tenet of underdetermination, that our theories are under-
determined by available empirical data, has over the years ramifi ed into 
a rich family of related concepts: Besides the general thesis of underdeter-
mination, which comes in “strong” and “weak” variants,6 other concepts
have been proposed, such as ampliative underdetermination,7 transient
underdetermination,8 empirical or observational equivalence9 local under-
1  Pierre Duhem, Th e Aim and Structure of Physical Th eory (New York: Atheneum, 1905).
2  Willard Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951): 20–43.
3  Larry Laudan, “Demystifying Underdetermination,” in Scientifi c Th eories, ed. Wade C.
Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 267–97.
4  Bas van Fraassen, Th e Scientifi c Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
5  Laudan, “Demystifying Underdetermination,” 267–97.
6  For example, in Th omas Bonk, Underdetermination: An Essay on Evidence and the Limits of 
Natural Knowledge (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).
7  Laudan, “Demystifying Underdetermination,” 267–97.
8  Lawrence Sklar, “Methodological Conservatism,” Th e Philosophical Review 84, no. 3 (1975): 
374–400.
9  Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin, “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination,” Th e 
Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 9 (1991): 449–72.
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determination10 and a host of others.11 Underdetermination is also, directly 
or indirectly, present in many current debates on realism and antirealism, 
induction, and the like. And underdetermination (and overdetermination) 
are also basic concepts in statistical and mathematical modeling and as such 
have a direct impact in a number of scientifi c disciplines both in the natural 
and social sciences.
Th e fact that underdetermination comes in diff erent shapes and sizes 
also means that the original concept has been to some degree obfuscated 
and has lost its initial focus. Since the evolution of the concept and the 
ensuing debates about it are covered in a  number of books and articles,12
I will narrow my focus and concentrate on a specifi c problem in the current 
debate – underdetermination in model building and selection in biology – 
which can be addressed within the limited scope of this article, and which, 
nevertheless, has implications for the general thesis.
Underdetermination and Models
In many sciences it is a commonplace that for any given natural or social phe-
nomenon there are a number of legitimate ways to create its representation. 
For empirical observations or experimental data we can build (theoretically) 
an indefi nite number of models relating to diverse underlying theories and 
concepts. Th rough this connection, the concept of underdetermination is 
closely linked to model building and model selection. In statistical model-
ling, scientists work with a limited set of observations, for which an unlim-
ited number of models can be inferred. Immediately therefore the question 
arises as to how we decide which model out of this set of candidate models 
we should choose, and what is the justifi cation for such a choice.13 Th is can 
also be articulated as the “curve fi tting” problem, i.e., the task of fi tting 
10  Derek Turner, “Local Underdetermination in Historical Science,” Philosophy of Science 72, 
no. 1 (2005): 209–30.
11  Th ere are, of course, more classifi cations available, such as moderate and radical underdeter-
mination, etc. Cf. Seungbae Park, “Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science,” 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science/Zeitschrift  für allgemeine Wissenschaft stheorie 40, 
no. 1 (2009): 115–24.
12  For a short introduction see Stanford Kyle, “Underdetermination of Scientifi c Th eory,” in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed December 27, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2016/entries/scientifi c-underdetermination/.
13  I. A. Kieseppä, “Statistical Model Selection Criteria and the Philosophical Problem of 
Underdetermination,” Th e British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, no. 4 (2001): 761–62.
170
a curve through data points.14 Intuitively, we can see that there are infi nitely 
many curves that can agree with the data, but we are challenged to pick only 
one of them. At this point it is also apparent where this issue touches on 
the long-standing problem of induction in the philosophy of science. In the 
case of deterministic modelling, scientists face an almost identical challenge 
because there are usually a number of candidate models at hand. Th us, his-
torically, whole branches of mathematics and statistics are concerned with 
modelling and model selection.
However, if we closely scrutinize the problem of the selection of the 
models, we will soon see that the entire process is not only carried out with 
formally devised and executed methods, but also involves, on the part of the 
modeler, some subjective decisions which usually depend on his or her own 
scientifi c or philosophical leanings and other factors such as the circum-
stances of the research.
In this article, the problem of underdetermination is demonstrated with 
examples from the biological sciences. Th ere are several reasons for this. 
First, models in biology are so widespread that the topic is not merely a theo-
retical exercise but has many real-life examples with practical implications. 
Second, due to the advanced formalization of model building and selection 
procedures in biology we have the advantage of a  clear exposition of the 
issues related to underdetermination. Th e high level of formalism helps to 
clarify the outstanding problems which are a part of model construction and 
selection and which tend to be rather obscured in the general philosophical 
discourse.
Models in Biology
Models are now ubiquitous in many scientifi c disciplines including the life 
sciences.15 Generally, models can be defi ned as “abstractions or simplifi ca-
tions of a real-world system.”16 But if we try to fi nd a universally accepted
defi nition of a model we encounter a plethora of propositions that usually 
refl ect the author’s own underlying philosophical positions. For example, 
the semantical view conceives of models as entities that in some simplifi ed 
14  Aris Spanos, “Curve Fitting, the Reliability of Inductive Inference, and the Error‐Statistical 
Approach,” Philosophy of Science 74, no. 5 (2006): 1046–66.
15  Hiroaki Kitano, “Computational Systems Biology,” Nature 420, no. 6912 (2002): 206–10.
16  Mark L. Taper, David F. Staples, and Bradley B. Shepard, “Model Structure Adequacy 
Analysis: Selecting Models on the Basis of Th eir Ability to Answer Scientifi c Questions,” 
Synthese 163, no. 3 (2008): 358.
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way represent the target system with a relationship of isomorphism, partial 
isomorphism or, less restrictive, similarity.17 For philosophers, the character 
and scope of models in science is a matter of dispute, so we will fi nd a host of 
other defi nitions too. As the exact nature of the model–world relation is not 
so important for the general thesis that I advance in this article, I will adhere 
to the liberal defi nition given in the beginning of this paragraph that covers 
the most common uses of the term in the sciences, including biology, for 
which I will provide concrete examples of models representing real natural 
phenomena.
Th ere is one important point here, however, that concerns the relations 
between models and theory. It is sometimes argued, particularly by those
who subscribe to the semantic view of theories, that models are instantia-
tions of a general theory.18 In this framework, the theory can be conceived of 
as a family of models, (i.e., a generalized version of particular real models). 
We can usually make such a distinction for some models in physics, where 
a particular physical system (such as the Solar system) is an instantiation of 
a general theory (Newton’s laws). Although I consider this to be a valid point 
of discrimination, in biology such a clear-cut distinction between theories 
and models cannot easily be made. One reason is linguistic, since in biol-
ogy the terms “model” and “theory” are oft en used interchangeably.19 Quite
oft en the generalizations in population dynamics, from which I  draw my 
next example, are routinely referred to both as models and theories. So the 
boundaries here are obviously blurred.20
17 Frigg comes up with a  simple three-way classifi cation: representational models of phe-
nomena, representational models of data, and models of theory, but we can also fi nd other 
proposals. Th e examples in this article fall into the fi rst two categories, which are – in my view 
– non-exclusive. Representational models of phenomena cover “all relatively stable and gen-
eral features of the world that are interesting from a scientifi c point of view”. Representational 
models of data are “corrected, rectifi ed, regimented, and in many instances idealized version 
of the data we gain from immediate observation, the so-called raw data”. Models of theories 
have their origin in logic and conceive of models as instantiations of a theory (closed set of sen-
tences in a formal language). See Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann, “Models in Science,” 
in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed December 27, 2016, https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2016/entries/models-science/.
18 Roman Frigg, “Models in Physics,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 
December 27, 2016, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/models-in-physics/v-1.
19  Frigg also makes this point for some of the physical theories and models, where the two 
cannot be clearly distinguished (in particle physics).
20  For example, Berryman in his article discusses “predatory-prey theory”, whereas in other 
articles Wangersky, Berryman, Gutierrez and Arditi use term “predatory-prey model”. See 
Alan A. Berryman, “Th e Origins and Evolution of Predator-Prey Th eory,” Ecology 73, no. 5 
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Even if we adopt the view of models as constituents of a more general 
theory, there is also an epistemological reason why this is not possible: Sup-
pose we construct a model for a phenomenon in biology; subsequently we 
can build a  more abstract model that applies to more phenomena and so 
forth. It is then not clear when the models become general enough to form 
a  theory and stop being just models, since we can almost always abstract 
to a more general entity. Th is is why the model-theory dichotomy doesn’t 
hold, at least for the cases listed in this article. Because generality is also an 
important feature of models – as we will see – it is important to clarify this 
issue at this point before I continue in the exposition of the problem.
What I mean by models in biology will be demonstrated with the fol-
lowing real-world example of a lake ecosystem.
One of the models routinely used in biology is the one depicting the 
interactions of species with the environment. In this case, researchers built 
a  model of the lake ecosystem of Loch Leven in Scotland with a  special 
interest in mind – they investigated the combined eff ects of eutrophication 
and climate change on the quality of the water. 21 Th e quality of water is 
measured by the level of algal biomass – a  smaller level of nutrient pollu-
tion means lower levels of phytoplankton biomass. In the Loch ecosystem, 
one of the relationships has a predatory-prey character, because water-fl eas 
(Daphnia) graze on the algae. Th erefore due to this close dependence, the 
quantity of zooplankton can also be considered an indicator of water quality. 
Based on previous results, the researchers suggested which variables should 
be included in the models that would faithfully capture the key relation-
ships in the lake ecosystem. Due to the complexity of the ecological system 
the researchers employed several techniques: transfer functions, additive 
models, and varying-coeffi  cient models to deal with the lagged relationships 
and to explore non-monotonic trends, seasonality and relationships among 
variables. Th e models made use of the following variables: nutrients (soluble 
reactive phosphorus – SRP, and nitrate-nitrogen – N03-N), zooplankton or 
water-fl eas (Daphnia), water temperature, and chlorophyll-a (algal biomass), 
with chlorophyll-a and zooplankton considered the response variables. 
Th ey built several diff erent models of relationships between variables as 
(1992): 1530–35; Peter J. Wangersky, “Lotka-Volterra Population Models,” Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics 9 (1978): 189–218; Alan A. Berryman, Andrew Paul Gutierrez and
Roger Arditi, “Credible, Parsimonious and Useful Predator-Prey Models: A Reply to Abrams, 
Gleeson, and Sarnelle,” Ecology 76, no. 6 (1995): 1980–85.
21  C. A. Ferguson et al., “Model Comparison for a Complex Ecological System,” Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society) 170, no. 3 (2007): 691–711.
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well as a  combined model. In the fi rst step they tried to identify lagged 
relationships with the automatic identifi cation procedure SMISO (Seasonal 
Multiple Input Single Output), which employs the Gauss-Newton iterative 
stepwise algorithm for the computation, and uses the Bayesian information 
Criterion (BIC) to select the most appropriate one. Further, they went on to 
build varying-coeffi  cient models and additive models, for which they used 
F-statistics (classical hypothesis testing) to select among the models.
What can be learned from this modelling exercise? As the authors 
conclude, in a complex ecological system such as Loch Leven, a variety of 
models are required to account for the web of relationships in the system.22
Although the authors built more than a dozen models they still suggested 
further refi nements that would bring more accuracy or a  more realistic 
representation of the processes in the Loch. Among the possible improve-
ments would be to consider Daphnia and algae as a combined (instead of 
individual) response, and to construct multivariate models which would 
include external variables other than water temperature.
Th is simple example fully illustrates the intricacies accompanying 
model building.23
One decision that has to be made is which variables should be included 
in the picture. Th e authors admit that the number and type of variables in 
the model was based on previous knowledge so the necessary exploratory 
work had been done. To keep the model simple they selected only fi ve vari-
ables out of 150 that they had at their disposal, and the rest – covering other 
chemical, biological and climatic features of the lake – were left  out. More 
parameters (variables) in the model would increase its precision (goodness-
of-fi t) but would come at the expense of the parsimony of the model and 
22  Ibid., 709.
23  Th e situation in which scientists have multiple candidate models is far from rare in biology, 
but rather constitutes a widespread pattern. For example, in one project, scientists sought to 
identify the factors that infl uence density levels of cutthroat trout (Oncorhyncus clarki lewisi) 
and brook trout (Salveinus fontinalis) in Montana streams – native and invasive species re-
spectively. Scientists modelled the levels of the fi sh in their habitat with the help of 38 abiotic 
and biotic (including anthropic) variables such as elevation, slope, aspect, latitude, longitude, 
stream size, and bed type, and anthropic factors such as the levels of grazing, mining, and 
logging, which were further reduced into 8 factors. Aft er they included interactions and qua-
dratic terms in the model they ended up with dozens of credible candidate models, a situa-
tion which required the choice of selection criteria on which they would need to base their 
decision. See Mark L. Taper, “Model Identifi cation from Many Candidates,” in Th e Nature of 
Scientifi c Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical, and Empirical Considerations, ed. Mark L. Taper
and Subhash R. Lele (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 488–524.
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its explanatory power, which would thus hinder the understanding of the 
crucial relationships in the ecosystem.
From this example it ensues that the study of biological phenomenon 
usually entails creating multiple models, which, as with any generalizations, 
never capture all the details, but selectively refl ect a  mere portion of the 
underlying reality.
How to Choose a Model?
With a  number of candidate models at hand, scientists have to decide 
which one best satisfi es their criteria. One of the most common questions 
is whether they prefer parsimony or goodness-of-fi t in the model, because 
not all of these “desiderata”24 are attainable at the same time, which means 
that during the selection process they must accept tradeoff s of some kind. 
Scientists usually obtain a closer fi t to the data when the model has more 
parameters but this is at the expense of its simplicity and of the intelligibility 
of the more complex model.
In statistical modelling, the tradeoff  between the parsimony (simplic-
ity) of the model and its goodness-of-fi t has an exact expression.25 When
choosing the models of the relationships in Loch Leven, the researchers took 
advantage of several model selection methods, such as the Bayesian infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) and classical hypothesis testing (F-statistics) which 
can quantify these tradeoff s.
Th ese two measures are not the only ones as statisticians have developed 
a number of methods of model selection – in addition to classical hypothesis 
testing (Neyman-Pearson) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), there 
are the maximum likelihood method, minimum description length method, 
cross-validation techniques and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) – all 
of which provide a  measure of balance between the goodness-of-fi t and 
parsimony of the model, although each of them has diff erent merits and 
underlying conceptual ideas.26
24  “Desiderata” is a  term coined by Levins. See Richard Levins, “Th e Strategy of Model 
Building in Population Biology,” American Scientist 54, no. 4 (1966): 431.
25  More about parsimony in Kenneth P. Burnham and David R. Anderson, Model Selection 
and Multimodel Inference: A Practical Information-Th eoretic Approach (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 2002), 443.
26  Th e overview of these methods can be found in Burnham, Model selection and Multimodel 




How these particular measures work will be illustrated with the ex-
ample of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)27 based on the information
theory, which also measures the trade-off s between the parsimony and the 
goodness-of fi t of the model to the data. Th e AIC is calculated in one of the 
following ways:
Using the maximum likelihood estimate (L) and the number of model 
parameters (k)
AIC = -2 ln (L) + 2 k,
or, alternatively, using the residual sum of squares of the model (RSS), sam-
ple size (n), parameters of the model (k), and assuming normal distribution
AIC = n [ ln ( RSS / n ) ] + 2k
As can be read from the equations, AIC rewards the fi tness of data (sum 
of squares) but penalizes adding extra parameters (k) into the model. AIC 
is a relative measure; a lower value for a model indicates that from a set of 
candidate models, this model has the fewest parameters which are still an 
adequate fi t to the data.
All the methods mentioned above diff er in respect to how they can be 
used and what they express. For instance, classical hypothesis testing can 
only be used for nested models,28 whereas AIC and its derivates can compare 
both nested and non-nested models. As to the balance between goodness-of-
fi t and complexity of the models, AIC penalizes the complexity of the model 
as measured by number of parameters more than Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC), etc. On the other hand, AIC only compares models relatively to 
the set of candidate models and doesn’t measure the overall fi t to the data.
When applied, these model selection procedures give varying results as 
diff erent models are singled out as “best” by the procedures. As Forster re-
marks, the matter is far from settled and there is “considerable disagreement” 
when it comes to application of selection methods among the theorists,29
and therefore there is no universal criterion that would be preferred by the 
scientifi c community. More selection methods also bring other factors into 
27 First proposed by Hirotugu Akaike in 1973. In Hirotugu Akaike, “A  New Look at the 
Statistical Model Identifi cation,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 19, no. 6 (1974):
716–23.
28  Nested models are those that are related, i.e., one is the simpler case of the other.
29  Forster, “Key Concepts in Model Selection: Performance and Generalizability,” 216, 229.
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play such as the context of the research and the underlying beliefs of the 
scientists. And it goes without saying that working with diff erent models 
when they are taken as a representation of underlying reality can have seri-
ous practical implications.
Deterministic Models in Biology
In other areas of biology the situation is similar, for example deterministic 
models of population dynamics (predator-prey) oft en have to balance op-
posing requirements and vacillate between goodness-of-fi t and parsimony, 
and other desiderata. As in other areas, a multiplicity of models in popu-
lation dynamics is commonplace. In their overview of the current state of 
population biology, Berryman, Gutierrez and Arditi present more 27 types 
of predator-prey models.30 Apart from the original Lotka and Volterra
models from 1926 and 1928 respectively, they list a number of other models 
with their characteristics: mass-action models, prey-dependent functional 
response models, logistic ratio-dependent functional response models, 
etc.,31 and they also discuss the suitability of each type of model and the 
conditions under which they can be applied including their advantages and 
drawbacks. All these models vary in regard to their generality, parsimony, 
time scales or purpose for which they have been built, and this determines 
their utility in a particular research situation. Th e scientist-modeler always 
has to confront the challenge of how sophisticated the model should be, how 
many relationships and of which type should be included or omitted and 
other factors.
Th is problem cannot be easily remedied. As population biologist Levins 
stated in his landmark paper “Th e Strategy of Model Building in Popula-
tion Biology,”32 the challenges that a scientist-modeler in population biology 
has to address come from the fact that the scientist has to simultaneously 
take into account various kind of heterogeneity (physiological, and age) in 
the multiple species involved in the model. Moreover, biological systems 
are subject to continuous changes as a result of infl uences of other species 
30  Th e classical Lotka-Volterra model depicts prey-predator dynamics with the following dif-
ferential equations:  dx/dt = αx – βxy,  dy/dt = γxy – δy,  where x is the number of prey organ-
isms, y is the number of predator organisms, and α, β, γ, δ are parameters describing the 
interaction of the species.
31  Berryman et al., “Credible, Parsimonious and Useful Predator-Prey Models,” 1982.
32  Levins, “Th e Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” 421.
Petr Jedlička
177
and of the environment. 33 How can we deal with such a complex system,
asks Levins? An extremely precise mathematical model which would try to 
capture the network of existing relationships “would require using perhaps 
100 simultaneous partial diff erential equations with time lags; measuring 
hundreds of parameters, solving the equations to get numerical predictions, 
and then measuring these predictions against nature.”34 Such a gargantuan
task was intractable in Levins’ day, since the equations would not be solvable 
analytically and the limited power of computers at the time rendered even 
approximate solutions diffi  cult to obtain.
As a  result, building such models of relationships in biology again 
involves navigating the treacherous waters of tradeoff s. Models exhibit ei-
ther parsimony, or precision, or other scientifi c virtues (desiderata) such as 
generality, but not all of them at the same time. Th e fact that these virtues 
cannot be upheld simultaneously also shows that the performance of the 
models vary in concrete situations as their aptitudes for a  particular use. 
Also, these distinctions cannot on the whole be simply explained away by 
the reality that is modelled, but also hinge on the personal decisions of the 
scientist or on other extra-scientifi c circumstances.
Levins was the fi rst to notice the existence of tradeoff s and the fact that 
scientists are compelled to choose a certain strategy, and he also put forth 
his own typology of these tradeoff s. Th e scientist can choose whatever desid-
erata should prevail in the model – either generality, or realism or precision, 
but never all three of them at once. Th ere always have to be some virtues 
which are preferred and some that are neglected. Th us the scientist faces 
a  trilemma and is pressed to adopt one of the following strategies: either 
sacrifi ce generality to realism and precision, or sacrifi ce realism to generality 
and precision, or sacrifi ce precision to realism and generality.
Over the time the theorist proposed other taxonomies of trade-off s. 
For example, Matthewson and Weisberg put forth a typology in which they 
identifi ed three types of tradeoff s: “strict tradeoff s”, “increase tradeoff s”, 
and “Levins tradeoff s” (which drew on Levins’ original concept).35 Unlike 
Levins, Matthewson and Weisberg maintain that generality, which features 
prominently in many theories of science as a  desired theoretical virtue, 
comes in more than one kind. Th us, they distinguish among two types of 
33  Th ere are also other issues that further complicate the situation – the model doesn’t count 
on perpetual genetic changes in population, etc.
34  Ibid., 422.
35  John Matthewson and Michael Weisberg, “Th e Structure of Tradeoff s in Model Building,” 
Synthese 170, no. 1 (2009): 189.
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generality within the models and propose a new concept of a relationship 
between these two types and precision.
In general, the majority of scientists admit the existence of at least some 
tradeoff s, although some theorists raised criticisms.36
Which Factors Determine the Scientists’ Decision?
Th e multiplicity of models of natural phenomena and the plurality of selec-
tion criteria demand an answer to the question of what the determinants in
the selection process are. As suggested above, the non-availability of a gener-
ally accepted rational and formalized method for a model selection process 
suggests that there must be other factors at play. When factors such as the 
empirical characteristics of the modelled phenomena or its representational 
logic are not able to explain the selection, it is apparent that we must look for 
the answer somewhere else, and this is where the “subjective” or “external” 
factors enter the picture.
As we have seen in the fi rst example of modelling at Loch Leven, ex-
ternal factors can be detected for example in the purpose of the scientifi c 
project, which was in this case an analysis of the impact of climate change 
and pollution on the Loch’s ecosystem. In general the factors determining 
the fi nal features of the model can be divided into several groups such as 
the background of the scientists and the research tradition they work in, the 
purpose of the modelling and fi nally the available technology and methods 
at their disposal.37
36  Orzack raised some critical issues for the concept of tradeoff s, which were later dispelled 
by Levins himself and other authors. Criticism of Levins’ claims is given for example in 
Steven Hecht Orzack, “Th e Philosophy of Modelling or Does the Philosophy of Biology Have 
Any Use?” Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 367, no. 1586 (2012): 170–80 and 
other articles. Other authors rebutted the criticism, e.g., Jay Odenbaugh, “Complex Systems, 
Trade‐Off s, and Th eoretical Population Biology: Richard Levin’s ‘Strategy of Model Building 
in Population Biology’ Revisited,” Philosophy of Science 70, no. 5 (2002): 1496–507.
37  Th is was the case of modelling the trout populations in Montana rivers as well. Taper main-
tains that the choice of one particular selection criterion over another depends also on the 
purpose of the modelling task, i.e., a  scientist can apply one criterion for empirical models 
(where the goal is to minimize the prediction error), and another for mechanistic or descrip-
tive models – and this is fully legitimate because these models serve diff erent purposes. And 
selection criteria lead to varying results since they single out specifi c qualities of these models. 
(See Taper, “Model Identifi cation from Many Candidates,” 494.)
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Background of the Scientists
From historical studies of science (Fleck, Polanyi) it is clear that scientists 
do not live in a social vacuum, but that they form distinct groups and col-
lectives with particular research traditions that impact upon the way in 
which they approach their work. Aft er providing an affi  rmative answer to 
the existence of tradeoff s, Levins himself sought to uncover these unknown 
elements in decision making.38 He asserts that the one of the factors that 
shapes decision-making is the background of the scientists. According to 
him, physicists entering the fi eld of population biology conform to the tradi-
tion of their original discipline and tend to build models with general yet 
unrealistic equations and thus sacrifi ce realism to generality and precision. 
Th ey seek idealized models typical in physics and do not take into account 
the fi ne details of the workings of a real-world ecosystem such as “time lags, 
physiological states, eff ect of a species’ population density on its own rate of 
increase”, because they expect that these eff ects will cancel each other out. In 
a similar vein, fi shery scientists who work in the fi eld take a more practical 
approach that requires precise and testable predictions and sacrifi ce general-
ity to realism and precision. Levins, a farmer turned population geneticist 
and mathematical ecologist, found himself in the third group, together with 
a handful of other authors – they sacrifi ce precision to realism and gener-
ality, since they are more concerned with the qualitative rather than the 
quantitative features of the model. Th us each group resolves the trilemma by 
choosing other preferred virtues.
By the same token, Wangersky debunked how “social” factors such as the 
background of the scientists translated into their work and modelling itself. 
He hypothesizes that biology is occupied by two distinct groups – theorists 
and experimentalists, wherein the former oft en come from mathematics or 
physics and lack the necessary knowledge of biological principles, and the 
latter are “innocent” in mathematical techniques.39 Th is tension results in 
diff erent modelling philosophies or approaches, in which these groups tend 
to create models with diverse qualities such as generality or predictive power.
Aims of Modelling
We have seen that in addition to the background of the modelling, its aims 
also have implications for the choice and fi nal form of the model. Several 
38 Levins, “Th e Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” 422–23.
39  Wangersky, “Lotka-Volterra Population Models,” 189–218.
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classifi cations of models based on their goals have been proposed – they 
take into account the diff erent purposes of the models, or their distinctive 
features.
Taper, Staples, and Shepard40 emphasized that scientists must take into 
account the scientifi c question that the model seeks to answer. Th e choice is 
oft en based on the model’s “ability to answer questions of interest”, which 
can depend on the purpose of the modelling – either theoretical or practical 
(applied science). As a result, the model selection method can vary. Based on 
their examination, they also pinpointed two pathways for developing mod-
els in biology: either to build exploratory complex models which however fi t 
poorly to data and give unreliable predictions, or to build a host of simpler 
candidate models.
Wagnersky furnished yet another typology of models which plays on 
their quintessentially opposite approach as to how they grapple with natural 
phenomena and the aims of their construction.41 Models serve diff erent 
purposes and that is why they do not look and perform the same. Th ey can 
be distributed along a spectrum, where at one end would be the descriptive 
models and on the other end analytical models. Descriptive models aim to 
“condense” the empirical data, and they display a close fi t to it. Analytical 
models, on the other hand, seek primarily to describe the mechanism of 
the system as they are mostly based in logic and lead to a better conceptual 
understanding of the system and its dynamics. Analytical models can boast 
of better predictions in unstable or changing conditions, whereas descrip-
tive models perform better when the system is stable. Most models fall in 
between these two extremes.
State of Technology
Decision making necessarily involves other outside infl uences such as the 
state of technology and current methods employed by the scientifi c commu-
nity. Th is can be illustrated in the changes brought about by the proliferation 
of computers in contemporary science, which has also been one of the driv-
ing forces behind the extensive use of models in science.
Other factors notwithstanding, computers play a  decisive part in the 
model selection process. While the human researcher is prone to favor 
models that capture the essence of the studied phenomenon, computers 
40  Taper et al., “Model Structure Adequacy Analysis,” 357–70.
41  Wangersky, “Lotka-Volterra Population Models,” 189–218.
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do not possess such restrictions except for their own computational capac-
ity. Without a doubt, computational limitations that plagued generations of 
scientists before the era of computers no longer have much relevance for 
present research. Complex biological systems can be successfully modeled 
not only in population biology but also in other disciplines such as genetics. 
Th is recent development has been strongly felt in modelling. Turney in his 
analysis of modelling practices argues that, since computers can now handle 
hundreds of variables, the decisions regarding the choice of models should 
be shift ed from the dilemma of accuracy–simplicity as stated before to the 
dilemma of accuracy–economy (of computation) and thus refl ect the poten-
tial of modern technology.42 In his view, in contemporary science, despite 
the massive computer power there is still an unsubstantiated tendency to 
favor simpler models, which cannot be explained by anything other than 
inherited routines and practices of the scientists.
Lastly, it is not only the power of hardware that makes its mark on the 
business of modelling, but also the choice of soft ware that shapes the think-
ing of the scientists, as is a well-known occurrence not only in biology but 
also other disciplines that rely heavily on modelling (such as sociology or 
economics). In biology, Levins noted this trend already in the 60s and coined 
for it the pertinent term “Fortran ecology”, as Fortran was the dominant 
programming language used in biological modelling in his days.
As we have seen, the diffi  culties implicit in model building and selection 
cannot be fully ameliorated. It is obvious that scientists’ backgrounds and 
their research traditions, together with the purpose of the modelling and 
the available technology and possibly other factors are implicated in the way 
the problems are articulated and solved in modelling. Th ese factors play an 
important part in model building and selection in biology and cannot be 
circumvented.
Conclusion
Th ere is a  necessary corollary to the fact that all models are abstract and 
simplifi ed representations of phenomena: in the process of model building, 
a loss of information about the target system that is being modelled appears. 
Th is loss can appear in various stages of the modelling process. In addition, 
the extent to which we lose information from the target system is to some 
42  Peter Turney, “Th e Curve Fitting Problem: A Solution,” Th e British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 41, no. 4 (1990): 511.
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extent arbitrary, and can be minimized or maximized by the decisions made 
by the scientist. Th e result is the multiplicity of models in biology. On top 
of that, the criteria devised to help us balance out some of these confl icting 
demands also vary. All these factors have a bearing on the fi nal form of the 
model. And, since there is no clear distinction between models and theories 
in biology, all these fi ndings apply to biology theories as well. Henceforth, in 
our view, the legitimacy of the underdetermination thesis is established in 
the biological sciences.
Th is conclusion also has far-reaching implications for other tenets in 
the philosophy of science. For example, if we take a closer look at one of the 
scientifi c virtues, parsimony, which is the embodiment of Occam’s famous 
medieval dictum “Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate”: Occam’s 
razor echoes prominently in most of modern science, and it is also – as we 
have seen – a fundamental principle in modelling. However, closer analysis 
reveals that it should be considered rather as a  successful heuristic rule 
which doesn’t have much of a  scientifi c substantiation itself, since it was 
devised as a concession to the weakness of human minds. As some authors 
(Turney) claim, at present computers can handle more variables than ever, 
but in scientifi c practice there is still a signifi cant preponderance of simpler 
models. Th us, parsimony as a principle is applied more for the convenience 
of humans – and this is exactly where internal representational logic and 
rationality of research clash with human limitations and values.
Th e inadequacy of the human mind was acknowledged already by 
Levins,43 who deems that the existence of a plurality of models is inevitable, 
because of the irreconcilable confl ict between the limited capacity of the 
human mind and the inherent richness and diversity of nature. Th e human 
mind is not able to embrace the heterogeneity of natural systems and because 
of this seeks to reduce complexity into simpler and comprehensible models, 
which is also an expression of the innate human search for understanding 
and control.44 Odenbaugh, in his defense of Levins, provides similar argu-
43  Levins, “Th e Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” 431.
44  In relation to this issue, yet another question begs to be answered: Besides the practical 
considerations such as the limitations of computational power, are there any inherent limits 
to modelling stemming from the fact models as well as theories can be understood as formal 
systems? Th ere are indications that there is some substance to this idea. For example, Suppes, 
who claims that models in the empirical sciences, e.g., in physics, biology, and economics, can 
be recast as axiomatized formal systems (i.e., set-theoretical entities, which comprise a  set 
of objects, relations and operations on these objects), also advanced the idea that there is no 
substantial diff erence between these models in the well-developed empirical sciences and 
those in pure mathematics, see Patrick Suppes, “A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of 
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ments. He contends that the natural complexity of the world results in epis-
temological diffi  culties.45 Scientists have only restricted cognitive abilities 
to handle the given load of information and operations involved in certain 
types of mathematical representations.46
Occam’s razor is just one of the many factors that intervene in model 
building. As I have shown, there are a number of other entwined factors – 
scientists’ backgrounds, pressures of tradition, tacit research assumptions, 
purpose of the research, all of which eff ect to a various degree an imprint on 
the products of science, i.e., models and theories. If we accept their incursion 
into science, we come closer to the views propounded by sociologists or phi-
losophers of science, who are credited (or criticized) for bringing a portion 
of “non-rationality” into science. Besides Kuhn or Feyerabend, who built 
their philosophies entirely around the extra-scientifi c or non-rational fac-
tors in science, it was among others Hesse47 who broached the topic of “non-
logical” or “extra-empirical” values with regard to models, or Bloor, whose 
Strong program strives to uncover the “social” considerations of scientifi c 
theories.48 Th is view obviously stands in opposition to the convictions of 
some traditional hardline rationalists with their creed that science is always 
rational and that empirical data impose only one possible interpretation. Th e 
Models in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences,” Synthese 12, no. 2/3 (1960): 289, 294. But
this approach, which conceives of models as formal systems, inevitably opens the door for all 
its ensuing mathematical, logical and philosophical implications. (A somewhat contradictory 
picture is painted e.g., van Fraassen, Scientifi c Image, 56). Van Benthem adhered to this line
of thought and linked the foundational issues in mathematics such as axiomatization, deriv-
ability, defi nability, consistency, completeness, and decidability with theories in the empiri-
cal sciences and he sees these issues as relevant to theories in empirical sciences (Johan Van 
Benthem, “Th e Logical Study of Science,” Synthese 51, no. 3 (1982): 451–52). Yet, if this is the 
case, would then, for example, the limitations such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems apply 
to modelling too? Since empirical models (such as the examples cited in this article) make 
extensive use of mathematics applied to real-world phenomena, these constraints would apply. 
Although these hurdles might seem quite insignifi cant to current empirical sciences – for such 
purely formal models are seldom construed – they can, however, squelch enthusiasm for the 
ultimate prospects of mathematical models of nature. As van Benthem and Suppes realized, 
one of the prime examples – in which these concerns would not be merely hypothetical – is the 
debate about reductionism, which is seminal for all empirical sciences.
45  Odenbaugh, “Complex Systems,” 1499–500.
46  And he also adds that other pitfalls for the scientist-modeler stem from the chasm between 
the simplifi ed and controlled environment at a  scientist scientists’ lab on the one side, and 
complex living nature on the other.
47  Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1980).
48 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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confl icting views of these two groups can hardly be reconciled. However, 
the position of the former and their perspectives seem to be vis-à-vis the 
evidence presented in this article vindicated.
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